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Abstract: Hayek’s contribution to law has been criticized and disputed. This paper 
shares the opinion that the significance of Hayek’s legal writings and their 
relevance to law and economics can only be understood by jointly analyzing his 
economic and legal theories. Moreover, I will argue that both theories must be 
reconsidered in light of Hayek’s theory of mind. This theory represents the key to 
understanding Hayek’s thought in that it provides an insight into the complexity of 
cognitive and psychological determinants of coordination processes. The latter are 
essential for understanding the emergence of social institutions. From this 
perspective, Hayek’s theory bears close relevance to current research in law. He 
suggests a different methodological approach in which the analysis of the 
micro-foundations of behavior is of central importance. I argue that such 
multidisciplinary inquiry can contribute to legal theory by explaining perception in 
decision-making processes. This line of analysis may also contribute to a normative 
legal theory that reduces errors in legal contexts. Such an interdisciplinary approach 
seems to be consistent with the OIE requirement — in the tradition of Veblen and 
Commons — that economic science must deal with a consistent theory of human 
behavior. 
 
Keywords: cognitive economics, Hayek, law and economics, neuroeconomics, 
Posner  
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In the past few decades, the behavioral approach to law and economics has shown the 
importance of cognitive biases in legal behavior. Authors like Christine Jolls, Cass R. 
Sunstein, and Richard Thaler (1998) have emphasized the advantages that may result 
from introducing important insights of behavioral economics to the economic 
analysis of law. Moreover, Jolls and Sunstein (2006) argue that both procedural and 
substantive law should be revised in light of the empirical evidence about the role of 
cognitive biases in behavior. This new research approach points to the need of new 
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Hayek’s Legacy 
economic models for understanding and explaining complex phenomena, including 
the evolution of social norms and legal rules. 
As a co-author and I have argued elsewhere (Ambrosino and Biancone 2013), 
the debate on the behavioral approach to law and economics (Jolls 2007; Jolls and 
Sunstein 2006; Mitchell 2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b) creates room for cognitive 
economics to help explain the complex determinants of legal behavior. Cognitive 
economics, more than behavioral economics, goes back to the history of economic 
thought and grounds its inquiry on a multidisciplinary investigation of human 
behavior. By focusing its inquiry on the micro-foundations of decision-making, 
cognitive economics may yield better understanding of reciprocal causation 
connections between legal rules and individual behavior1. Legal theory must deal with 
the complexity of real society and must provide an explanation of the mechanisms 
that produce pattern of regularity in human behavior. Therefore, a proper cognitive 
approach can aid legal theory in explaining law and institutions on the basis of a 
consistent theory of human decision-making.2 
Friedrich August von Hayek is recognized as one of the founders3 of the 
cognitive approach to economics (Egidi and Rizzello 2004; Rizzello 1998). The close 
connection between his theory of mind and his economic theory helped open the way 
to modern cognitive economics from both theoretical and methodological points of 
view. His theory of mind (Hayek 1952) shows how agents codify information and use 
dispersed knowledge to make economic choices. Rules of behavior, resulting from this 
cognitive process, become settled rules when they allow coordination in social 
interaction. 
Nevertheless, Hayek’s legal theory has been widely neglected both by traditional 
law and economics literature, on one side, and by behavioral law and economics, on 
the other. R.A. Posner (2003) criticized Hayek’s legal theory and his analysis of the 
1 The reciprocal causation processes between human behavior and institutional changes is one of the 
main research interests of the cognitive approach to economic institutions. Hodgson’s ideas (2003a, 2003b) 
of upward causation and reconstitutive downward causation in the process of institutional change, mainly 
contribute to developing the idea of a complex dynamic of reciprocal causation in the evolution of 
economic institutions (Ambrosino 2006, 2012).  
2 Cognitive economics aims at explaining institutional change and evolution of law on the ground of 
a multidisciplinary inquiry. There is a strong connection with the original institutionalism in that (Dyer 
1998; Parada 2001; Rutherford 1996), which restates the Veblenian critique and points out that standard 
economics suffers from multidisciplinary incompatibility (Brown 2013). 
3 Hayek’s (1933, 1937, 1952, 1960, 1962, 1973, 1976, and 1979) as well as Herbert Simon’s (1947, 
1955) research is considered among the main contributions to the development of cognitive economics. 
Their work points to the lack of foundation in standard economic assumptions and opens a new debate on 
the aims of economic research. Economics starts to be considered a science of complex phenomena. Other 
relevant scholars who contribute to the development of cognitive economics include Daniel Kahneman 
and Amos Tversky (1979), Vernon Smith (1989), and Thomas Schelling (1960). Part of cognitive 
economics scholarship focuses on institutions (defined as shared rules of behavior) and — in the tradition 
of old institutional economics — and describe a process of reciprocal causation that links human behavior 
and institutions (Hodgson 1993, 2000, 2002, 2003a, and 2003b). Social reality is characterized by an 
ongoing evolutionary process of change. Cognitive theory of economic institutions suggests a new 
interdisciplinary approach to investigate such processes (Ambrosino 2006, 2012; Rizzello 1998; Rizzello 
and Turvani 2000, 2002).  
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role of the judge as lawmaker. In this paper, I will focus on three main grounds. The 
first is that Posner considered the role of the judge described in Hayek’s theory to be a 
passive one (Zywicki and Sanders 2008). According to Posner’s interpretation, the 
judge must only enforce the social order instead of consciously pursuing wealth 
maximization. The second relates to Posner’s argument that there is no room for the 
evolution of law in Hayek’s legal theory. The third pertains to Posner’s opinion that 
Hayek makes confusing use of the expression “rule of law.” 
I will argue that a better answer can be given to Posner’s criticisms when Hayek’s 
legal and economic writings are jointly reconsidered in light of his theory of mind. 
This analysis of Hayek’s contributions will precede the discussion of how relevant his 
theory of mind is to modern legal theory as the main inspiration for developing a 
proper cognitive approach to an economic analysis of law. Hayek’s legal theory has 
been criticized from within original institutional economics (OIE) (Hodgson 2009), so 
he cannot be simply classified as an institutional economist in the tradition of 
Thorsten Veblen and John R. Commons. Nevertheless, Hayek’s legal theory regarding 
how institutions are defined as unplanned outcomes of human actions, and how rules 
structure social interactions, shows the relevance of cognitive science as a basis for 
understanding human nature. As I have suggested elsewhere (Ambrosino 2006, 
2012), and as William Redmond (2006) and Christopher Brown (2013) argue, the 
original institutionalism is grounded on the criterion of conceptual integration — 
meaning, on “the principle that the various discipline within the behavioral and social 
science should make themselves mutually consistent, and consistent with what is 
known in the natural science as well” (Cosmides, Tooby and Barkow 1992, 4, in 
Brown 2013, 211). The cognitive approach to law inspired by Hayek’s work may also 
contribute to the development of institutional economics in the OIE tradition.  
I organize the paper into five sections. Sections one and two reconstruct Hayek’s 
theory of mind and legal theory, respectively, referring especially to the “rule of law” 
and the role Hayek attributes to the judge in civilized systems. Section three discusses 
the links between two levels of analysis, the mind level of the sensory order and the 
social level, considering how determinants of human behavior contribute to shaping 
legal rules. Section four reevaluates Hayek’s legal theory with respect to Posner’s 
criticisms. It focuses on the meaning Hayek’s work acquires when it is analyzed as part 
of a complete research program and in light of his theory of mind. Section five 
discusses the perspective opened by Hayek’s approach for current research on law and 
economics. 
 
Hayek’s Theory of Mind, Individual Behavior, and the Role of Institutions 
 
During his career, Hayek moved slowly toward an idea of economics as the study of 
complex systems in which biology, systems theory, and many other disciplines are 
involved. In the 1930s, his economic ideas started to change. His article, “Economics 
and Knowledge” (1937), is regarded as the watershed in Hayek’s transformation (Foss 
1995). From this essay on, it became clear that Hayek conceived of economic issues as 
complex phenomena, and that he would deal with them by investigating different 
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Hayek’s Legacy 
research fields. Nevertheless, an earlier article of his, “The Trend of Economic 
Thinking” (1933), already furnished important insights into the role of spontaneous 
institutions and knowledge in solving problems in society (Ambrosino 2006). These 
two papers marked the beginning of a shift from Hayek’s first works on issues of 
technical economics to ones of social theory, biology, psychology, and systems theory. 
Hayek’s contribution was in placing economics among those sciences that study 
complex adaptive systems. These economic systems are built by human behavior, and 
they require institutions. 
Hayek’s interest in human cognition and the functioning of human mind dates 
back to the early 1920s when he was still a student. In those years, he worked on a 
paper, “Contribution to the Theory of the Development of Consciousness,” which 
was never published. However, years later, it formed the basis on which The Sensory 
Order (Hayek 1952) was developed. There has been much discussion on the influence 
of this study on Hayek’s economic theory and the existence of a systematic research 
program in his work (Egidi and Rizzello  2004; Rizzello 1998). This paper argues that 
Hayek’s theory of mind is also essential for understanding his legal theory as part of 
his research program, and for appreciating the opportunities offered by his theoretical 
approach to modern law and economics. 
Hayek’s theory of mind describes human mind as an adaptive classification 
system in which external stimuli are ordered and classified so that individuals can act 
in every circumstance of their ordinary lives. This classification system consists of 
neural connections that are the result of both biological inheritance and an 
individual’s past experience derived from acting in the external world. The 
classification process is contextual and complex. The order attributed to each 
particular input depends on the other inputs that arrive with it, so that there is no 
one-to-one relationship between each given stimulus and the sensory order. Moreover, 
the sensory order that arises is idiosyncratic for each individual. It depends on both 
the external stimuli and the specific neural system involved in the process. Although 
individuals’ neural systems have important features in common, they are also unique 
to each person. Also unique to individuals are their particular past experiences, which 
play an important role in the perception process. 
The classification process is adaptive because it is modified by both a process of 
natural selection in forming the organism’s set of neural connections and by life 
experiences. “Map” is the term Hayek used to define the neural connections system 
that the mind creates over an individual’s life span. This map is subject to continuous 
— though very gradual — change (Hayek 1952, 110) caused by the interplay between 
the brain’s physical structure and particular stimuli experienced by individuals in their 
life experience. By means of its classification processes, an individual’s mind is able to 
maintain and continuously update a model of the environment as it has been 
experienced by the individual. 
The slow adaptive process characterizing the mind’s functioning is what allows 
behavioral routines to change. The perception and classification of external stimuli 
are strongly related to rules of action. In each problematic situation, the outcome of 
the perception and classification process incorporates information about the rules of 
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action needed to face that situation. Routines are rules of behavior emerging from the 
classification of external stimuli in order to react to particular circumstances in ways 
that have proved effective in managing such circumstances. The feedback on their 
action that agents receive from the external world makes it possible to turn effective 
behavior into a routine, applied whenever a similar situation arises. Moreover, a 
negative feedback is required to start a slow process of change in behavioral rules. 
Once a routine (or habit of behavior) is formed, in Hayek’s theory, it is an institution 
in the sense that it becomes a shared rule of behavior inducing individual action. In 
that sense Hayek’s idea is not far removed from Commons’s definition of institutions 
as “collective action inducing individual action” (Commons 1959, 701). Settled rules 
of behavior can change over time, and this has been apparent in the history of 
civilization. When environmental changes and consolidated rules are no longer 
suitable for the needs of managing agents, a slow evolutionary process begins. In 
Hayek, this does not mean that human being are passively permitting environmental 
changes to remodel their individual habits (Ambrosino 2012).4 
Hayek’s theory of mind shows the importance of cognitive processes and past 
experiences in shaping individual behavior and the idiosyncrasy of classification 
processes. These elements acquire even greater importance if they are linked to the 
problem of knowledge, which Hayek (1937) believed to be the central issue in 
economics. People in society act to satisfy their own interests, but, in shaping their 
expectations, they must consider that information is not complete. Rather, 
information is dispersed. Moreover, agents are able to process the information they 
do through their peculiar classification system, thereby developing idiosyncratic 
knowledge. Human action hence reproduces rules of behavior that are not 
deliberative creations. This idea is also explicit in Veblen (1919; see also Giddens 
1984 and Polanyi 1967) who emphasizes the function of habitual and only-partially-
deliberative actions in retaining knowledge and skills, and in promulgating them 
through society (Hodgson 1994, 62). Economic growth depends on whether dispersed 
knowledge can be fully exploited, so as to convey “to the individuals such additional 
knowledge as they need in order to enable them to dovetail their plans with those of 
others” (Hayek 1944, 521). 
How can a social order emerge from such dispersed and idiosyncratic 
knowledge? If the reason people follow certain rules, and not others, can be 
understood simply by studying the activity of human brain, this would suggest that 
society is a system in which the combination of elements is important. The simple 
addition of elements, however, cannot be all the explanation, because “the existence 
4 Commons (1959) argued something similar. He discussed the modification of institutions and 
customs due to changes in economic conditions. He argued that “economic change and development result 
in new social group and classes, new conflict, institutional realignments, and changes in the mix of customs 
(Commons 1959, 292-293). As pointed out by Alan Gruchy (1947, 164 in Jensen 1987, 1052), this does 
not necessarily mean that Commons’s argument was that human beings are passively permitting their 
individual habits to be remodeled mechanically by the unfolding power of economically induced changes 
in customs. 
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Hayek’s Legacy 
of those relations which are essential for the existence of the whole cannot be 
accounted for wholly by the interaction of the parts” (Hayek 1967, 71). 
There are two conditions for a social order to exist. First, individuals must be 
able to perceive and classify other people’s behavior to understand how to behave. 
Second, the actions of multiple individuals with idiosyncratic and partial knowledge 
must coordinate. Agents must give meaning to others’ behavior in order to interact 
with them, to focus their own aims, and to plan their action. They do this through 
mental processes. It is through perception that the microcosm of the mind builds a 
model of the external macrocosm (Hayek 1952, 198). An agent classifies others’ 
behavior by referring it to a principle of conformity with the rules of behavior that he 
himself/she herself applies. In other words, “the perceiving individual’s own action 
patterns provide the master moulds by which the action patterns of other individuals 
are recognized” (Hayek 1967, 57). This implies that agents, at least partially, share the 
set of actions that they apply. However, this does not mean that agents must be all 
identical. Rather, they “must be made up of the same ingredients, however different 
the mixture may be in particular instances” (Hayek 1967, 59). 
The second requirement for a social order is coordination among actors. Hayek 
(1960) argued that it is the process of civilization that enables the emergence of 
common rules of behavior. Civilization is what allows agents to manage dispersed 
knowledge. It “begins when the individual in the pursuit of his ends can make use of 
more knowledge than he has himself acquired and when he can transcend the 
boundaries of his ignorance by profiting from knowledge he does not himself 
possess” (Hayek 1960, 24). Civilization is made by man. It is the product of the 
actions of hundreds of generations of agents, but it is not the product of human 
design. Man cannot impose a particular order created by his/her mind upon the 
world. This is because a human mind is itself an adaptive system which changes in a 
way that man can adapt to his/her surroundings. 
As a consequence of agents’ actions, a spontaneous order “of human activities of 
much greater complexity will form itself than could ever be produced by deliberate 
arrangement” (Hayek 1967, 162). This does not mean that a society without rules will 
develop. Rather, it means that society will be based on general, end-independent 
rules, applying to all individuals. These rules, which guide man’s behavior in forming 
correct expectations about others, are selected in social interaction with others by 
means of the imitation and evaluation of rules of conduct, habits, and traditions. The 
process, in which rules are culturally selected, takes place at the social group level. The 
social groups that apply better rules can achieve better results than other social groups 
(Ambrosino 2006; Butos and McQuade 2002). Hayek’s spontaneous order does not 
mean that customs and spontaneous rules in modern society are always good enough 
to coordinate any agents’ behavior.  
Formal rules and established institutions are necessary in a civilized society. In 
fact, for Hayek, institutions as well as legal norms constitute the boundaries of 
individual actions. They enable agents to act and coordinate their behavior toward 
achieving their purpose. Rules of law and property rights, protecting agents’ 
autonomy against arbitrary interference, are needed to promote the emergence of 
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spontaneous order and progress in civilization. Nevertheless, this does not imply that 
a central planner is necessary. As social environment changes, institutions evolve from 
a process of adaptation to past experience.5 Hayek’s rejection of rational 
constructivism is simply stated in the introduction to the first part of his Law 
Legislation and Liberty (1973, 5):  
 
This intellectual tradition can be shown to be false both in its factual and 
in its normative conclusions, because the existing institutions are not all 
the product of design, neither would it be possible to make the social order 
wholly dependent on design without at the same time greatly restricting 
the utilization of available knowledge. That erroneous view is strictly 
connected with the equally false conception of the human mind as an 
entity standing outside the cosmos of nature and society, rather than being 
itself the product of the same process of evolution to which the institutions 
of society are due.6  
 
Hayek’s model of human mind is, therefore, strictly related to his idea of 
spontaneous evolution of social norms and institutions. Better rules of conduct 
give an advantage to those social groups that use them, and they are learned and 
imitated by other social groups or future generations. This process of cultural 
evolution makes it clear that “our habits and skills, our emotional attitudes, our 
tools, and our institutions all are in a sense adaptations to past experience which 
have grown up by selective elimination of less suitable conduct” (Hayek 1960, 
26). This process is also what allows the slow change of social norms and 
institutions as the environment changes. 
According to Hayek’s theory, institutions arise by a process of spontaneous 
cultural evolution. It is institutions, as abstract codes of conduct, which allow 
individuals to satisfy their changing expectations and to reduce uncertainty. 
Legislators and the state perform an essential role in discovering such 
spontaneously evolved rules and institutions, as well as in giving them the status 
of established social institutions. 
Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution has been widely criticized. Some 
representative criticisms include those of D.R. Steele (1987), G.M. Hodgson 
(1993), Ulrich Witt (1994), and P.J. Boettke (1990; for a more complete 
discussion on Hayek’s idea of cultural evolution, see Caldwell 2000, 2002), 
among others. Despite these criticisms, as I argued in this section of the paper, 
5 Also, in Commons, institutions create viable social order. What is different between Hayek and 
Commons is their interpretation of the evolutionary process that generates institutional change 
(Commons 1924). 
6 Different from Hayek’s judge, who is concerned only with perfecting an existing social order, 
Commons’s judge is guided by the public purpose involved in the case. Commons recognized the 
influence of personalities of individual judges. Thus, court opinions would change not only when new 
cases are presented or when economic or political conditions change, but also with changes in the judges 
(Leathers 1989). 
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Hayek’s theory of cultural evolution of institutions mainly directs scholars in the 
field to develop a more interdisciplinary approach. His research moves fearlessly 
into new fields and disciplines in search of consistent explanation to complex 
phenomena (Caldwell 2002, 2004). 
Nevertheless, social order in civilized society needs codified general rules of 
law and established institutions. Hayek (1973, 1976, and 1979) discussed the 
way in which spontaneously emerged rules of behavior should be codified in his 
legal theory. In the next section, I discuss Hayek’s legal theory, with particular 
regard to the role of the judge as lawmaker. 
 
Hayek’s Legal Theory and the Role of the Judge 
 
Hayek’s legal theory is closely linked with his social and economic theory. Agents face 
a problem of coordination in social contexts that are characterized by dispersed 
knowledge. Spontaneous order emerges from their interactions through a process of 
selection and imitation. This problem raises important questions about what kind of 
legal rules can enforce such an order and who must establish them. 
Civilized society needs legal norms and institutions in order to achieve order 
and peace (Commons 1925). In fact, agents act in pursuit of their own personal 
interests. They do so by interacting with other people whom they did not previously 
know. Hayek described this kind of interaction as a game in which the players must 
abide by a set of rules. Hence, in order to improve the efficacy of the game, rules (such 
as contract law and property rights) are slowly developed (Hayek 1978, 73). 
It is these rules that allow agents to be free in their choices. Agents should be 
free under the law. This means that when they obey laws, in the sense of general 
abstract rules, agents are not subject to another man’s will (Hayek 1960, 153). In 
Hayek’s theory (1960), law is a sort of invisible boundary within which the activity of 
each individual has a secure sphere to unfold. 
Important insights into Hayek’s legal theory can be drawn from most of his 
works. In this paper, I pay particular attention to his books, The Road to Serfdom 
(1944), The Constitution of Liberty (1960), and Law Legislation and Liberty (1973, 1976, 
and 1979), to show the evolution of Hayek’s conception of the “rule of law” and his 
analysis about the role of the judge in society. In fact, The Road to Serfdom (1944) is not 
greatly concerned with legal theory. Nevertheless, in it, Hayek provides a definition of 
the “rule of law” and discusses its role in free societies. The rule of law implies that 
the power of government is limited by previously fixed rules. These rules allow 
individuals to construct correct expectations on how and when the state would use its 
coercive power, and then to make their own choices. 
Under the rule of law, government should only set general rules to be applied to 
general situations. Individuals should be completely free to evaluate time and space 
circumstances. Only agents involved in real decision processes can know the exact 
circumstances in which they must act and to which they must adapt their behavior. 
These general rules are translated into formal rules that are not created to favor 
particular subjects or group of subjects. General rules are means to achieve personal 
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aims available to everyone in society. They should be conceived of as remaining in 
force indefinitely as tools enabling agents to build correct expectations about others’ 
behavior. 
Hayek was aware that the complete realization of a society based on the rule of 
law is not possible because governments consist of men liable to make mistakes. He 
argued that governments should have as few opportunities as possible to apply their 
coercive power freely. Law can limit the range of tools available to individuals to 
achieve their purposes, but governments can never frustrate individual efforts with 
particular purposeful laws. 
Another point emphasized by Hayek in The Road to Serfdom (1944) is that, in a 
system based on the rule of law, the direct impact of the state’s action in any given 
case will be less clear. The result will be a social system in which it is not possible to 
foresee exactly what the outcome of settled rules will be. This is the consequence of a 
system of general laws (different from specific orders) that must be applied in different 
circumstances which cannot be predicted in all their aspects. The effect that these 
general laws will have in each circumstance, and with respect to each individual, 
cannot be known in advance. 
The ideas that Hayek simply enunciated in The Road to Serfdom (1944), are better 
developed in The Constitution of Liberty (1960). In this latter book, Hayek (1960, 153) 
returns to the relationship between freedom and law, reiterating his central idea that 
“the conception of freedom under the law ... rests on the contention that when we 
obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid down irrespective to their 
application to us, we are not subject to another man.” Life in society is possible 
because individuals act in accordance with certain rules. Such rules “tend to develop 
from unconscious habits into explicit and articulated statements and at the same time 
to become more abstract and general” (Hayek 1960, 148). The nature of these general 
rules differs from that of specific commands, which determine solely the action to be 
performed. Indeed, general rules (law) should be settled “once and for all” (Hayek 
1960, 149). They should be directed at unknown people and be extraneous to 
particular circumstances of place and time. The rationale for these general rules, 
securing for individuals a known range within which they can make decisions, is to 
allow them to make the fullest use of available knowledge, especially of such concrete 
and idiosyncratic knowledge pertinent to the particular circumstance in which people 
happen to be. Rules are the result of a process of adaptation by the entire society to its 
environment and to the general characteristics of its members. Law defines the 
boundaries that agents must take into account when deciding their actions. These 
boundaries also enable agents to predict the consequences of their behavior (Hayek 
1960, 156) and to form plans of action that will be successful (Hayek 1960, 157). 
In defining the general rules, which are needed to guarantee the freedom of 
individuals, Hayek expanded the definition of “the rule of law” that he provided in 
1944. As suggested by Paul Cliteur (2000), it is possible to distinguish the following 
five characteristics of law under the rule of law: 
First, “the rule of law” means that government can use its power to encroach 
upon the freedom of individuals only in enforcing a known rule. It thus constitutes a 
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Hayek’s Legacy 
limitation on the power of government, including the legislature. The rule of law 
requires that all laws must conform to certain principles (Hayek 1960, 205). 
Therefore, it is a rule concerning what the law ought to be (Hayek 1960, 206). 
According to Hayek, this implies that the rule of law can prevail only if it is part of the 
moral tradition of the community or a common ideal shared by the majority. Only in 
this case does the legislator feel bound by it (Hayek 1960, 206). 
Second, the law should consist of general and abstract rules referring to 
unknown cases. These rules must represent the framework within which agents can 
take their own decisions in pursuit of their own ends. Hayek argued that it is generally 
the most important aspect of the law. The fact that the lawgiver does not know in 
advance the particular cases in which rules will apply, and the fact that the judge who 
applies them can only draw conclusions, which follow from the existing body of rules 
and the known facts of the case, are guarantee that laws, not men, rule (Hayek, 1960, 
153). 
Third, the law must be prospective in its effect. It determines only some of the 
conditions that individuals’ actions must satisfy. It applies to unknown people only 
when certain conditions are present. Therefore, the lawgiver cannot predict what the 
effect of a particular law will be on particular people, and for what purposes people 
will use it (Hayek, 1960, 52). The lawgiver confines himself/herself to general rules 
because of his/her necessary ignorance about the special circumstances under which 
they will be applied. He/she fixes some firm data for the use of those who have to 
make plans for particular actions. In so doing, the lawgiver provides opportunities but 
never certainties about the results of agents’ efforts (Hayek, 1960, 58). 
Fourth, the law must be known and certain. Certainty is a central feature of the 
law. It is the factor that has contributed most to the prosperity of the west because it 
allows for the efficient running of a free society. Hayek underlined that complete 
certainty is something that can only be approached. “The degree of the certainty of 
the law must be judged by the dispute which do not lead to litigation because the 
outcome is practically certain as soon as the legal position is examined” (Hayek 1960, 
208). 
Fifth, the last requirement of the law is equality. This means that the law should 
apply equally to all. To do so, the law must refer only to formal characteristics of the 
persons toward which it is directed. Nevertheless, Hayek argued, classifications always 
leave room for the possibility of forming classes, consisting only of particular persons. 
Moreover, equality before the law is the chief safeguard against the possibility that the 
law will set severe restrictions on liberty. If the only special power given to government 
is enforcing the law, there will probably be little prohibition of what anybody might 
reasonably wish to do (Hayek, 1960, 155). 
Moreover, in The Constitution of Liberty (1960), when dealing with the problem of 
safeguarding individual liberty, Hayek outlined his theory about the judge’s role in a 
system based on the rule of law. He would subsequently address the issue more 
thoroughly in Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973, 1976, 1979). 
I will now discuss the point concerning limitations on the judge’s discretion in 
deciding disputes. Hayek argued that “the task of the judge is to discover the 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
 de
gli
 St
ud
i d
i T
or
ino
] a
t 0
7:5
1 2
3 J
uly
 20
15
 
Angela Ambrosino 
 
29 
 
implications contained in the spirit of the whole system of valid rules of law or to 
express as a general rule, when necessary, what was not explicitly stated previously in a 
court or by the legislator” (Hayek 1960, 212). This means that the judge must 
interpret some formal or informal preexisting rule. Whereas informal rules are 
customs and shared habits of behavior, formal rules are legal norms guiding agents’ 
behavior in a given time. The judge cannot follow his/her own will in the pursuit of 
particular aims, and his/her interpretation of the law can be subject to review by a 
higher court.7 Moreover, “rules must not be made with particular cases in mind nor 
must particular cases be decided in the light of anything but general rule — though 
this rule may not yet have been explicitly formulated and therefore have to be 
discovered” (Hayek 1960, 210). What Hayek argued is that the judge, as a policy-
maker, has to follow a discovery procedure like the one in which agents are involved 
who act within a competitive market (Hayek 1960, 1973). In fact, people acting within 
a competitive process can progressively discover what wants are worth satisfying, and 
thus modify their behavior. Hayek considered common law as an effective mechanism 
for discovering legal rules (Christainsen 1990, 499). It does not mean that Hayek was 
not aware that, in the real world, the common law process can fail under the pressure 
of various social and legal purposes to be achieved. Hayek’s idea of common law as a 
“perfect” mechanism for discovering legal rules is, above all, a description of what it 
should be.8 
This short discussion of the judge’s role implicitly contains two important topics 
which Hayek addressed in Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973). First, the judge plays the 
role of a discoverer of law. Second, the legal framework in which he/she performs 
his/her task is constituted by the outcomes of historical accidents or the application 
of inherited principles to new situations. 
The first part of Law, Legislation and Liberty (1973) starts with a critique against 
constructivism in the process of law creation. The main contention is that most of the 
rules of conduct that govern human action, and most of the institutions that arise 
therefrom, are the result of a process of adaptation to the impossibility for anyone to 
take a conscious account of all facts, entering into the order of society. Moreover, the 
idea of a developed mind able to design the institutions that should make life in 
society possible is contradicted by everything one knows about the evolution of man 
(Hayek 1973, 17). The mind itself is the result of a process of adaptation to natural 
and social surroundings. It is a product of the social environment in which it has 
grown. Man lives in a cultural context in which there exist certain practices and rules 
7 Hayek’s idea of the judge’s role is quite different from Commons’s. As pointed out by C.G. 
Leathers (1989), Commons’s “‘[j]udge made law’ evolves through ‘artificial selection’ by the ‘visible hand’ of 
the court … In making a decision, the judge reduces common practice to precision and adds an organized 
legal sanction. Since conflicting precedents build up over time, judges have opportunities to choose among 
competing customary practices … Commons’s judges are guided by the public purpose involved” (Leathers 
1989, 368). 
8 G.B. Christainsen (1990) suggests that Hayek did not completely understand common law process 
deception because he underestimated the extent to which property rights structure governs the process of 
law creation. 
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of behavior that have prevailed over time because they have made a group of men 
successful, but which were not deliberately created to serve particular purposes. 
This discussion is crucial also for understanding Hayek’s idea of the role of the 
judge in social systems based on the rule of law. His legal theory draws a distinction 
between law and legislation. Law came before legislation: Not all the rules that people 
follow in society are of a legal nature, but individuals use them because they enable 
society to make decisions in situations of limited information. Social order and the 
survival of society result from a process in which rules emerge and evolve. Legal 
systems and authority are needed to command obedience because they enforce laws 
presumed to exist independently and to rest on a widely-shared opinion of what is 
right (Hayek 1973, 95). The development of legal systems within which the judge 
plays a prominent role is, therefore, the outcome of a continuous process of evolution 
in the course of which the spontaneous growth of customs and deliberate 
improvements of an existing order have constantly interacted (Hayek 1973, 100). 
These are systems that select the “right rules” among those that spontaneously emerge. 
Legal systems need the activity of lawmakers. These may be legislators who enact laws, 
or judges who play a crucial role in adjudicating laws. In the part of Law, Legislation 
and Liberty, referring to the common law systems, Hayek pays particular importance to 
the role of the judge. 
The role of the judge, who must enforce and improve law, can be better 
understood by considering that “he is called to correct disturbance of an order that 
has not been made by anyone and does not rest on the individual having been told 
what they must do ... The judge is in this sense an institution of a spontaneous order. 
He will always find such an order in existence as an attribute of an ongoing process in 
which the individuals are able successfully to pursue their plans because they can form 
expectations about the actions of their fellows which have a good chance of being 
met” (Hayek 1973, 95).9 
Hayek rejected both the idea of the judge as someone who simply applies a given 
law and as a producer of efficient law. Hayek’s judge is an extender and discoverer of 
law. Indeed, he/she produces law, but does so by extending (or limiting) the existing 
legal tradition. More than a lawmaker, the judge is a discoverer of rules compatible 
with the spontaneous order (Deffains 2002; Hayek 1973).10 Under Hayek’s idea of the 
judge’s role, there is a distinction between discovering procedures and efficiency 
(Christainsen 1990). Hayek’s spontaneous order is based on efficiency rules that are 
able to coordinate agents’ behavior. Hence the judge’s law-discovering activity is not 
9 Also, Commons admitted that the judicial process of developing common law works reasonably 
well in adapting the working rules of governments and private collectivities to changing conditions, 
although special problem areas remained. Those problems are due to the fact that Commons recognized 
the large influence of habitual assumptions and personalities of individual judges in their ordinary work 
(Leathers 1989, 369 and 370).  
10 On the contrary, in the tradition of Commons, judges are guided by public purpose and decide on 
a case-by-case basis. Each decision must conform to past precedents, but the judge must evaluate the parties 
involved in the dispute, too. Moreover, the judge will never be able to foresee all the possible consequences 
of his/her decision. The adequacy of the rule can be tested only through its effects on society. Any new rule 
can give rise to new conflicts (Commons 1924). 
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aimed at developing an efficient system of legal rules. As pointed out by G.B. 
Christainsen (1990), compared with the neoclassical aims of economic efficiency that 
refers to a hypothetical situation of equilibrium, “[t]he notion of an effective discovery 
procedure … refers to an ongoing process whereby information about not-yet-
exhausted gains from trade is continually and economically uncovered and 
disseminated to individuals. It refers to the learning that takes place under perpetual 
disequilibrium rather than a general equilibrium in which all learning has 
stopped” (Christainsen 1990, 500). 
To say that the judge discovers rules that serve to maintain an existing order 
implies that there is a difference between these rules and the resulting social order. 
The judge should create general and abstract rules to be followed by all. A rule of this 
kind is something that has to be found to prevail. It is not something that a mind can 
deliberately create (Hayek 1973, 97). The aim of each rule must be to allow the 
matching of expectations on which individuals depend for their success (Hayek 1973, 
98). Hayek suggested that to maintain the existing order, rules should direct 
individuals’ behavior in two ways. On one hand, individuals’ actions do not 
unnecessarily interfere with each other. On the other hand, under circumstances 
where the success of an individual’s action depends on its matching with the action of 
others, there will be at least a good chance that the matching will occur (Hayek 1973, 
99). 
As long as the existing rules, both formal and informal, efficaciously enable 
agents to achieve their purposes, there is no need for intervention by the judge. But 
when it is not possible to form legitimate expectations about the outcome of a 
situation, it will be necessary to appeal to the judge, who should be knowledgeable of 
the established rules. The judge cannot make rules that he/she wants. The judge 
cannot do so either in situations in which he/she must decide on conflicting 
expectations, based on already-established rules, or on new situations where there is 
no known rule to guide him/her. Rather, the judge must discover a rule that fills the 
gap from among already established rules, or must rule consistently with the existing 
body of rules so as to maintain and even improve social order. Once pronounced, the 
judge’s ruling must be recognized as appropriate by the members of society (Hayek 
1973, 100).11 
Hayek argued that the judge is expected to maintain order. This does not imply 
that he/she must maintain a particular state of affairs. Rather, Hayek referred to the 
regularity of the process by which agents form their expectations without interference 
of others. The process by which the judge contributes to the social order is continual. 
In deciding a specific case, both the judge and the parties involved should not be 
interested in the effect of their decision on social order. If the rule established by the 
11 Again, Hayek’s position is quite far from the OIE tradition of Commons. In Commons’s 
opinion, customs are man’s response to the evolving conditions of material scarcity and conflicts of 
interests (Commons 1924). While customs have a leading role, Commons argued that they are imprecise 
and imperfectly obeyed. Moreover, they do not exert sufficiently strong sanctions to determine human 
behavior. Only organized and purpose-oriented institutions can reliably create regularity in behavior 
(Gonce 1971).  
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judge proves successful in helping individuals to form correct expectations, it will 
integrate itself into the existing body of norms, thus contributing to social order on its 
own. 
The judge contributes to the process by which society adapts to new 
circumstances. This is the process by which social order improves. In fact, the judge is 
integral to the system of selecting existing norms that leads to social order, wherein 
only efficacious norms survive. Moreover, when performing his/her function, the 
judge creates new norms. He/she does not create a new order, but helps maintain and 
improve the functioning of the existing one (Hayek 1973, 19). 
Finally, Hayek was aware that the judge may sometimes err, or be influenced by 
his/her preference for a particular end when evaluating a case.12 Nevertheless, there is 
no room in his/her task for an emotional response or a personal preference (see 
footnote 9). Most cases that the judge must resolve will have only one appropriate 
solution. The fact that intuitions may contribute to the judge’s ability to formulate the 
right solution does not mean that emotional factors, rather than rational ones, are the 
determinants of the result. The task of the judge, in Hayek’s theory, is “one of testing 
hypotheses at which he has arrived by processes only in part conscious. But although 
he may not know what led him in the first instance to think that a particular decision 
was right, he must stand by his decision only if he can rationally defend it against all 
objections that can be raised against it” (Hayek 1973,  20). 
 
Hayek’s “Rules, Perception and Intelligibility”: The Link Between His Theory 
of Mind and His Legal Theory 
 
In 1962, Hayek published a paper entitled “Rules, Perception and Intelligibility” in 
the Proceedings of the British Academy. In it, he sought to explain the relationship 
between the rules governing perception and those governing action. The paper does 
not seem to explicitly relate to the rule of law idea and to the role of the judge in 
modern society. Nevertheless, it is of great importance to understanding the 
relationship between the sensory and social order regarding the capacity of individuals 
to perceive their own behavior as consistent with existing classifications, and to follow 
rules of behavior that they recognize as shared by the social community to which they 
belong. The same paper, published after The Constitution of Liberty and before Rules 
Legislation and Liberty, is the key to understanding Hayek’s legal theory in light of his 
theory of mind. In it, he conducted an inquiry into the links between the rules of 
perception governing the mind as a classification system and the development of 
individual behavior consistent with shared general rules. The relationship between the 
two levels of rules — the rules governing perception and action — is a crucial point to 
understand in order to evaluate the connection between Hayek’s theory of mind, set 
out in sensory order, and his legal theory. 
12 Hayek was aware that, in real life, the common law process can be defective. However, he believed 
that the mechanism for discovering legal rules allows a better transmission of information than a legislative 
process aimed at shaping an efficient system of legal rules (Ambrosino 2006).  
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The main idea developed in Hayek’s article is that there is a certain level of 
general rules governing human action that are of the same kind as those governing 
perception. It is this connection that enables Hayek to argue for the existence of rules 
“implicit” in human behavior. This is often referred to as the latency of rules in the 
philosophy of law. Such rules consist of behavioral regularities that are followed by 
actors, but cannot be explicitly stated by them (Hayek 1962, 43). 
Hayek observes that, as in the case of language, agents act and acquire skills with 
unexpected ease, but characteristic of these skills is that individuals are usually unable 
to explicitly state the rule that governs their action (Hayek 1962, 43). He argued that a 
better term for skills of this kind is “know-how,” which consists exactly of the capacity 
to act according to rules that agents are able to discover, but which they are not 
(required to be) able to state in order to follow them. As the first insight relevant to 
my purpose here, Hayek stated that the sense of justice pertains to those cases of a 
capacity to obey rules which one does not know explicitly. This means that, by living 
in a certain social group, agents learn the main principles of justice, which have been 
developed over a period of time, and acquire the skills to obey them.13   
In a second relevant aspect to agents’ acting in compliance with implicit rules, 
the nervous system appears to act as a “movement pattern effector.” But, for this to be 
possible, the organism needs to recognize actions conforming to such rules or patterns 
without being consciously aware of the elements of which they are composed. Hence, 
in order to understand how agents can follow unformulated rules, one must first 
know how human minds develop a “movement pattern detector” (Hayek 1962, 45). 
This topic is closely related to the theory of mind developed in The Sensory Order 
(1952), where Hayek argued that action is the final step in the perception process. 
Here, the point stressed by Hayek is that general and implicit rules of this kind do not 
govern people’s behavior alone. They govern perceptions, particularly perceptions of 
other people’s actions. The process by which agents can perceive other people’s 
behavior as complying with some general rule is of particular importance when 
discussing how the lawmaker (judge or legislator) must evaluate any new rule to be 
enacted.14 Understanding which implicit rules are shared among people, and how 
they are recognized in social groups, could enhance recognition of what kind of 
formal rules may actually shape individuals’ behavior in modern society (Ambrosino 
2006). 
According to Hayek, the capacity to perceive regularities (rules) in the actions of 
others is what enables different persons to perceive that a particular situation is one of 
a certain kind (Hayek 1962, 46). He argued that one of the main instances in which 
agents are able to recognize others’ behavior is imitation. Nevertheless, before people 
can imitate, identification is necessary. Agents must establish a correspondence 
13 These skills in some sense can be consistent with Veblen’s definition of instincts as “generally 
inherited proclivities which favor specific reason or behavior” (Redmond 2006).  
14 This kind of implicit rule shared by agents seems to be consistent with Veblen’s instincts. In fact, 
instincts are efficient because they allow a reliable and speedy response to recurrent problems. They also 
supply a possible explanation for cross-cultural and trans-historical commonalities of behavior (Redmond 
2006).  
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between movement patterns that are perceived through different sensory modalities 
(Hayek 1962, 48). This presupposes the existence of a mechanism transferring the 
capacity to discern abstract orders from one field to another. Hayek maintained that 
this kind of transfer is of the same kind as that by which one can easily transfer 
learned skills from one hand to the other (Hayek 1962, 49). The point is that, if two 
different sensory elements are to be recognized as converging into the same pattern, 
they must have some features in common. The most important of these features is the 
space-time framework. 
As Hayek argued in The Sensory Order (1952), perception is the process by which 
human minds classify external stimuli, giving rise to patterns of classifications that 
enable agents to act. In “Rules, Perception and Intelligibility” Hayek emphasized that 
such patterns of classifications contribute to coordinating human behavior, and thus 
to achieving social order. Once acquired, these patterns of rules can be recognized in 
circumstances different from those that generated them. This is possible because — 
even if perception is strongly linked to space, time, and past idiosyncratic experience 
— each pattern of classified rules is activated in a mind whenever a certain 
circumstance shares attributes with those stimuli which originally gave rise to the 
classification. In Hayek’s view, this is because these patterns of rules, which govern 
actions, are not related to specific actions. Rather, they constitute a general schemata 
that is then adapted to each particular circumstance (Hayek 1952, 56). These patterns 
of regularities, or rules, enable agents to recognize shared purposes, moods, and 
attitudes in the behavior of others, and thus to coordinate their behavior. By so 
doing, agents generate social order. 
Hayek’s paper “Rules, Perception and Intelligibility” is essential for 
understanding the link between his legal theory and his theory of mind, formulated in 
The Sensory Order (1952). In fact, it clarifies the role of individual perception in 
developing general schemata like moral rules by which agents can evaluate other 
people’s behavior as corresponding or not to their own schemata (Hayek 1952, 56). 
The perception of others’ behavior is the first step in the diffusion of common 
behavior through an imitation process. This diffusion of effectively shared behaviors 
is necessary to obtain Hayek’s social order. 
Moreover, to return to Hayek’s idea of the judge’s role in law-creating, 
comprehension of individuals’ perception processes, as well as how perceived 
behaviors can be imitated and shared among people, seems necessary for 
understanding how (and with what kind of legal norms) social order can be improved 
or maintained. Hayek’s stress on the importance of individuals’ cognitive processes in 
developing morals has major methodological implications for a modern approach to 
law and economics. The next section of the paper addresses this point. 
 
Hayek’s Legal Theory and His Theory of Mind: A Different Interpretation of 
Posner’s Criticisms 
 
In this section, I focus on the main criticisms Posner (2003) levels against Hayek’s 
conception of the judge’s role in economic systems and to his/her contribution to the 
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law evolution. However, I will not analyze the legal philosophy under Hayek and 
Posner’s legal theory in any detail. Instead, I will simply assume that the latter 
(Posner) endorses a constructivist approach, while the former (Hayek) rejects it 
(Dimond 1980). Based on this assumption, the concern here will mainly be with the 
difference between the approaches of these two authors in developing their economic 
analyses of law. 
First, Posner considers Hayek’s role of the judge to be a passive one (Zywicki and 
Sanders 2008). The judge’s work is aimed at maintaining social order instead of 
consciously pursuing wealth maximization. Second, Posner argues that there is no 
room for the evolution of law in a theory in which the judge is averse to being 
creative, and merely works to enforce existing customs. These criticisms connect with 
another point Posner makes. In his opinion, Hayek makes confusing use of the term 
“rule of law.” 
According to Posner, Hayek rejected the idea of a central planner, because this 
requires too much information, preferring instead the alternative method of creating 
norms through customs. Customs give rise to a spontaneous order that is neither 
planned nor designed (Fleetwood 1996). In Posner’s view, under such a process of 
norms creation, the role of the judge in deciding concrete cases is not to make new 
rules or standards of conduct, but simply to enforce established customs. 
Consequently, the judge has a passive role. This point shows that the two authors 
have very different views on the nature of knowledge, and on what the normative 
purpose of law in society ought to be (Zywicki and Sanders 2008). Posner believes that 
the judge should consciously create law in order to achieve designed social goals — 
that is, wealth maximization. In doing his/her work, the judge must consider the 
future effects of the rule that he/she states. When evaluating a case, the judge must 
decide which one among possible solutions best contributes to increasing efficiency 
(Posner 2006, 2008). The judge is thus a lawmaker who seeks the most efficient rule. 
In doing so, he/she applies the mechanisms necessary to ascertain that facts exist for 
the correct application of law (Posner 1973). Posner’s judge, therefore, has the 
knowledge necessary to predict which rule will make society better off. There is the 
possibility that good sources of information will not be available to the judge, but this 
happens only in situations of social change. These are the cases, too, in which the 
judge should be strongly constrained by precedent (Posner 2003). 
By contrast, Hayek believed that laws should be created to maintain the 
spontaneous order in society. In his view, it is impossible for the judge to predict how 
and whether any decision that he/she makes can improve social welfare. The main 
reason for this impossibility is strictly connected with Hayek’s theory of mind. This 
theory explains why the idea of a mind, designing the institutions which make life in 
society possible, is contrary to everything researchers know about the evolution of 
man (Hayek 1973, 17). As argued in the first section, mind is the result of a process of 
adaptation to the social and natural environment in which man lives. It develops 
through a continuous process of interaction with the existing social institutions 
(formal or otherwise). Thus, human mind is the result of man’s having developed in 
society (Hayek, 1952). The cultural heritage with which man is born consists of having 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ita
 de
gli
 St
ud
i d
i T
or
ino
] a
t 0
7:5
1 2
3 J
uly
 20
15
 
 36 
 
Hayek’s Legacy 
acquired those rules of conduct that increase the chances of continuous existence for 
the group in which one lives. Yet, these rules of conduct were not adopted 
intentionally in the knowledge that they would lead to particular effects (Hayek 1973, 
17). Each individual in a group shares this cultural heritage. Each man living in 
society contributes to the gradual process of modification of social and economic 
institutions, but he/she does so only in pursuing his/her own interest, without 
necessarily considering the social effect of his/her choices (Ambrosino 2006, 2012). 
In the same way, the judge can only contribute to the creation of new laws by deciding 
cases solely on the basis of the concrete circumstances that he/she has, and without 
considering the possible effect of his/her decision in maximizing social welfare. The 
complexity and peculiarity of the cognitive processes characterizing human mind are 
key factors to be considered. These aspects are crucial when analyzing Hayek’s 
argument that it is impossible for the judge to predict how to increase social welfare 
because information is dispersed and the judge has only subjective knowledge of the 
cases.15 
Moreover, for Hayek, law plays the same role in society as other economic and 
social institutions (like prices). It provides decision-makers with the tools necessary to 
construct adequate expectations to plan their actions. Law, as a Hayekian institution, 
constitutes the framework that facilitates social coordination.16 When deciding 
concrete cases, the judge must not evaluate how his/her decision might contribute to 
social efficiency, but only whether the norm that he/she states conforms to the rule of 
law. The rule of law is strictly related to that general schema that agents develop 
through the perception and classification of external stimuli in social interactions and 
that determines the range of possibilities within which agents can make their choices 
(Hayek 1952, 1962). By finding the norm conforming to the rule of law, therefore, 
the judge can contribute to that social order which results from individual actions, 
not from human design. In Hayek’s legal theory, the judge “is called in to correct 
disturbance of an order that has not been made by anyone and does not rest on the 
individuals having been told what they must do” (Hayek 1973, 95). In Posner’s view, 
Hayek’s judge is passive because he/she merely enforces customs. However, the 
judge’s role seems to be somewhat more complex. He/she must intervene whenever 
there is a gap between actual behavior and the prescription of social order, and he/
she has the responsibility of making any new rule in coherence with the existing 
system of rules. This is what maintains social order. Moreover, this social order is an 
ongoing process in which agents can pursue their plans because they can form correct 
expectations about others. In this sense, the judge is himself/herself an active 
institution of spontaneous order (Hayek 1973, 95). Spontaneous order is an ongoing 
process, where any rule stated by the judge is within the nature of an intellectual 
evolution (Hayek 1973, 101). The task of the judge is to preserve the general 
15 This is different from what Commons argued about the role and purpose of the judge’s decisions 
(Leathers 1989). 
16 In that sense, Hayek’s institutions are consistent with Commons’s (1934, 69) idea of institutions 
as a “collective action in control of individual action.” Such control liberates and expands individual will. 
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framework of rules by assisting change as part of the process of adaptation to changing 
conditions (Hayek 1973, 101, in Leathers 1989). 
The second argument that Posner raises against Hayek’s theory derives from his 
view of the Hayekian judge as a lawmaker with the limited power of enforcing existing 
customs. According to Posner, Hayek considered customs as the only source of law 
and he was insufficiently critical of the limitations of custom as a normative order 
(Posner 2003, 151). The evolution of customs, he argues, need teleology to move 
toward efficient results. In particular, Posner points out that Hayek ignored two main 
shortcomings of customs as a source of social norms. First, Hayek suggested that there 
are circumstances where the freedom of action of economic agents gives rise to 
cooperative activities which cause damage to society as a whole. In these 
circumstances, Hayek believed, the judge should reject such customs in order to 
promote economic efficiency. This means that the judge somehow provides the 
teleology needed to redirect economic behavior. Second, Posner maintains that Hayek 
ignored the fact that customs change very slowly since there is no lawmaker giving 
them to society when needed. Hence, because the judge’s work is restricted to 
enforcing customs without regard to the consequences, it does not require any 
economic or social scientific analysis, nor does it contribute to the evolution of law. 
Returning to Hayek’s legal theory, it seems possible to add something to 
Posner’s interpretation. The use of the term “customs” to refer to Hayek’s concept of 
rule is misleading (Hayek 1962, 56), because it generally refers to the development of 
very specific actions. Instead, what Hayek had in mind are general and abstract rules 
of conduct possessing two main attributes. On one hand, men comply with existing 
rules without knowing them explicitly, and, on the other, they observe such rules 
because they give greater strength to the social group in which they are applied, but 
not because this effect is known by the group. In discussing the main attributes of 
spontaneous rules governing human conduct, Hayek explicitly stated that “in 
advanced society only some rules will be of this kind; what we want to emphasize is 
merely that even such advanced societies will in part owe their order to some such 
rules” (1973, 19). This point acquires particular meaning when one considers what 
Hayek argued in regard to the lawmaker’s role in political evolution. Social order is 
the unplanned outcome of an ongoing self-generating process of cultural evolution, 
and it is characterized by a level of complexity that human mind cannot master as a 
whole. In a social context of this kind, the main instrument advocated to change 
society is legislation. Nevertheless, because each single lawmaking act will take place 
within the ongoing process of spontaneous order, the legislator is never completely 
free to redesign the legal system. Lawmaking is necessarily a continuous process 
whereby every decision produces unforeseen consequences for those, whose decision 
can or must be taken next. All parts of the legal system are adapted to one another, 
not according to an overall plan, but by the successive application of general 
principles to particular problems (Hayek 1973, 65). There is an endless process of law-
changing, “every single step in this process is determined by problems that arise when 
the principles laid down by (or implicit in) earlier decisions are applied to 
circumstances which were not foreseen” (Hayek 1973, 65). The judge thus produces 
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new norms in response to unpredictable circumstances. In so doing, the judge 
remains within the boundaries established by the legal framework in which he/she 
operates, without questioning them or planning the direction of legal evolution. 
Discussing the role of customs or general rules in the creation of new norms by 
the judge brings out an interesting difference between Posner and Hayek’s theories. 
This difference can help understand the criticisms made by Posner against Hayek. 
Posner (1973, 2006) believes that customs become particularly important in the 
judge’s decision-making only in the cases of social change. These cases do not seem to 
be the ordinary circumstances in which the judge must do his/her work. Rather, they 
are in some way “extraordinary” cases. By contrast, because Hayek considered the 
social order to be an endless evolutionary process, he also believed that every 
lawmaking act will take place in a situation of social change. Social change becomes 
the ordinary case in Hayek’s theory.17 Nevertheless, Posner and Hayek’s conceptions 
of the role of customs in social change are not entirely different. 
Hayek’s argument regarding the boundaries imposed on the judge’s decision-
making does not necessarily imply that every act of lawmaking will be merely 
conservative. Hayek’s judge makes norms that conform to the existing legal system, 
but he/she does so without planning any social outcome. Of course, every lawmaker, 
when interpreting rules, not exactly extant in laws and precedents, will decide “to give 
the preference to what is still the predominant part of the law and to fit an alien 
element into it by so transforming it as to make it harmonize with the whole” (Hayek 
1979, 66). But a very different situation arises when the judge, in his/her function as 
lawmaker, understands that a new general philosophy of law has recently arisen which 
is contrary to large part of the existing law. In these situations, the judge will use the 
same habits and techniques that he/she uses in preserving the law to transform it. 
Thus, “the same forces that in the first condition make for lack of movement, will in 
the second tend to accelerate change until it has transformed the whole body of 
law” (Hayek 1973, 66). However, the end of this transformation process is not 
foreseeable. It will depend on the nature of the new philosophy, and it may either 
lead to a new equilibrium or to disintegration of the whole body of law as existing in 
society (Hayek 1973, 66). This is because, in Hayek’s theory, the process of cultural 
evolution leading to social order is not teleological, and hence not directed at any 
known goal (Hayek 1960). In this sense, the judge becomes a revolutionary force 
contributing to change toward a new, unforeseen spontaneous order. 
Finally, behind Posner’s criticisms of Hayek’s legal theory lies his conviction that 
the latter gave a misleading interpretation to the “rule of law.” Posner is not the only 
author to have criticized Hayek’s idea of the “rule of law” (Raz 1979; Sunstein 1996; 
Zywicki 1996). Nevertheless, the proper interpretation of Hayek’s conception requires 
one to consider the evolution of his concept of the “rule of law” in the development 
of his legal theory (Hayek, 1944, 1960, 1973, 1976, 1979). As I argue here, Hayek’s 
17 Also, the OIE tradition of Vebeln and Commons points out that human action takes place in an 
ever-changing environment, and it influences changes in human behavior. Human behavior, for its part, 
influences the institutional environment (Hodgson 1993). 
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concept of the rule of law is not related to an idea of a rule of good law, as Posner 
suggests. Posner maintains that, by interpreting “rule of law” to mean “true law,” 
Hayek set this concept in opposition to that of “bad law.” Hayek indeed used the 
expression “true law” with reference to “rule of law,” but his concept is multi-faceted 
(Zywicki and Sanders 2008). The meaning that he gave to this concept evolved, and it 
is not necessarily opposed to the modern characterization of it dating from A.V. 
Dicey’s work onward (Zywicki 2003). “Rule of law,” in Hayekian terms, means (i) the 
existence of boundaries to government action (Hayek 1944), and (ii) the legislating 
and enforcing of rules that are general, universally applicable, as well as known and 
certain (Hayek 1960, 205). Moreover, the most important feature of the rule of law is 
that it increases the predictability of people’s behavior (Hayek 1973).  
In Hayek, the best definition of rule of law comes from comparing this concept 
with its opposite, the rule of men. In a state under the rule of law, there is minimum 
arbitrary coercion of man by others, or by the state (Zywicki and Sanders 2008). As 
argued by T.J. Zywicki and A.B. Sanders (2008), one can understand why, in Law, 
Legislation and Liberty, Hayek argued that the common law system best embodies the 
rule of law, and that common law best enables spontaneous order. The rule of law is 
strictly linked with what Hayek posited in “Rules Perception and Intelligibility” 
concerning the relation between the rules of perception and of human action, and the 
role of these two levels in enabling agents to form correct expectations about their 
own and others’ behavior. It is under this definition of the “rule of law” that the 
judge contributes to the evolution of a set of rules which satisfy the requirements of 
generality, universality, and certainty, thereby becoming institutions of social order. 
 
Hayek’s Legacy: Toward a Cognitive Law and Economics Approach 
 
The analysis thus far supports Bruce Caldewell’s (2002) conclusion that one of 
Hayek’s most important legacies is the idea that economics of institutions must go 
against the disciplinary specialization, dominating social science in the last century. I 
suggest in this paper that Hayek’s legal theory can furnish important insights for the 
current economic analysis of law from both methodological and theoretical points of 
view. 
The need for a different approach to law is not new in legal theory. Indeed, 
since the 1990s, authors like Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein, and Richard Thaler 
(1998), among others, have questioned the relevance of studying human behavior to 
develop legal policies. The debate has led to the emergence of what is now known as a 
“behavioral approach” to law and economics. This approach draws on the tools and 
theoretical results of behavioral and experimental economics to reinterpret the 
standard models of law and economics by conducting a more complete analysis of the 
micro-foundations of human behavior. Scholars of behavioral law and economics 
believe that this approach can contribute to developing legal theory on a descriptive, 
normative, and prescriptive level. The original institutional economics stresses the 
existence of reciprocal causation processes between agents’ behavior and institutions, 
so that the former gradually changes in reaction to institutional transformation, while 
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the latter are strongly influenced by shifts in routines or habits (Ambrosino 2006; 
Hodgson 1993, 1994). Also, this research approach underlines that the inquiry into 
legal norms and social institutions must be based on a more acceptable theory of 
human behavior (Hamilton 1932, 85), and it must deal with a more interdisciplinary 
approach (Brown 2013). In fact, G.M. Hodgson (2009, 159) argues that “to place the 
explanation of the emergence of law in an evolutionary framework would require that 
one would address evolutionary theories in psychology that explain the origin and the 
transmission of particular motivation and deliberation.” A proper theory of law 
requires an explanation of how a system of complex legal rules may be enforced, and 
why people often obey laws in the absence of obvious (dis)incentives (Hodgson 2009). 
The importance of Hayek’s work has been widely recognized in experimental 
economics (Boettke, Coyne and Leeson 2008; Smith 2005), which is one of the main 
reference points for development of behavioral law and economics. However, Hayek’s 
contribution is still neglected in the discourse about a new approach to developing 
modern legal theory. Moreover, his legal theory continues to be highly criticized 
within the discipline. Original institutional economics, on the other hand, does not 
consider Hayek’s work to be in the tradition of Veblen and Commons, specifically 
pointing out the differences between Hayek and Commons’s views of government 
intervention and the evolution of institutions (Leathers 1989). Nevertheless, I submit 
here that Hayek’s methodological insights should be of interest both in developing a 
modern cognitive legal theory and in enriching OIE research. 
By contrast, many contemporary economics disciplines recognize the importance 
of Hayek’s ideas. In particular, both cognitive theory of economic institutions 
(Ambrosino 2006) and cognitive economics (Egidi and Rizzello 2004; Rizzello 1997) 
stress the importance of Hayek’s pioneering contribution to the development of both 
research fields. The cognitive approach to economic institutions, going back to the 
contributions of old institutional economics, assumes that actors have imperfect 
information and that knowledge is dispersed. This echoes Hayek’s idea that the 
emergence of institutions is a bottom-up process (Hodgson 2000, 2003a, 2003b). 
Moreover, Hayek’s view of the role of human cognitive processes in the emergence of 
behavioral norms has directed some of the research on institutions toward a cognitive 
multidisciplinary inquiry (Ambrosino 2006). 
The cognitive approach to economics focuses on the micro-foundations of 
human behavior (Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec 2005). It also stresses the 
importance of Hayek’s preliminary attempt to investigate the complexity of the mind 
and the role of human cognition in decision-making processes (Egidi and Rizzello 
2004). The cognitive approach shares Hayek’s contention that a multidisciplinary 
methodology is needed to investigate complex phenomena (Hayek 1952). Moreover, 
unlike pure behavioral economics, part of the cognitive approach suggests that 
multidisciplinary research cannot be reduced to the simple introduction of 
psychological or neurobiological insights into standard economics. Rather, it must 
comprise a comprehensive investigative approach aimed at understanding phenomena 
in their complex entirety, without conflating them into a standard model (Egidi and 
Rizzello 2004; Spada and Rizzello 2012). It seems possible to point out some relevant 
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connections between the goals of cognitive economics and original institutional 
economics. OIE defines economics as the science of human behavior and suggests 
that it is in need of proper psychological concepts to explain it (Clark 1918). 
Moreover, the reciprocal influence of institutions and human behavior could be 
explained by applying the tools of social psychology and other cognitive science 
(Hodgson 2004; Rutherford 2000). 
My findings in this paper make it possible to argue that better understanding of 
Hayek’s legal theory is feasible only if it is considered jointly with his theory of mind 
and his economic and legal theory. The importance of considering Hayek’s work in its 
totality, as a unified research program, has already been emphasized in various 
research fields. For example, S.A. Beaulier, P.J. Boettke, and C.J. Coyne (2005) and 
P.J. Boettke (1999) have argued that Hayek’s research program in economics 
overlapped with his (Hayek’s) research in politics and law.18 Other authors, such as 
Salvatore Rizzello (1997), Bruce Caldwell (2000), and Steven Horwitz (2000), have 
discussed the connection between Hayek’s economic theory and his contribution to 
cognitive psychology. 
As a preliminary step to inquiry into his legal theory, Hayek’s theory of mind — 
not just his economic theory (Beaulier, Boettke, and Coyne 2005) — highlights the 
importance of three key interconnected ideas. They play a fundamental role in his 
economic theory and explain the process through which social norms emerge and 
agents perceive other people’s behavior as conforming to shared rules. These ideas 
are: (i) the role of idiosyncratic knowledge and the complexity of decision-making; (ii) 
the rise of social and economic institutions as the outcome of a “bottom-up” process; 
and (iii) the need for implicit as well as legal institutions in modern society. Beaulier 
Boettke, and Coyne (2005) emphasize the relevance of similar ideas in Hayek’s 
economic and legal theory. They focus on the role played by the individual’s cognitive 
processes in both economic and legal issues, and argue that Hayek’s theory of mind is 
needed to understand these three ideas properly. 
The first idea concerns the role of idiosyncratic and dispersed knowledge in 
decision-making, and hence the complexity of decision-making processes themselves. 
This theme (as well as coordination) formed the core of Hayek’s works on economics 
in the 1930s and 1940s (Hayek 1937, 1945). But the problem of knowledge is also 
crucial when analyzing his theory of mind (Hayek 1952). Every classification is the 
outcome of a process in which the information that an agent gathers is processed by 
18 The idea of different stages in Hayek’s thought has been suggested by many scholars, and has given 
rise to a broad debate that different and opposed positions co-exist. That debate originates in Hayek’s 
outstanding versatility. His research extends from economics and social philosophy to political science, to 
legal theory. Thus, many authors find it difficult to consider Hayek’s work in its totality. For example, 
Terence W. Hutchison (1981) distinguishes between two sides of Hayek: the first being influenced by 
Ludwig von Mises and the second by Karl Popper. Ulrich Witt (1997) underlines that, in Hayek’s work, 
there are two distinct research programs based on different assumptions, perfect knowledge and 
idiosyncratic knowledge. Steve Fleetwood (1996) finds three different stages in Hayek’s work. Boettke 
(2000, xii), on the contrary, suggests that Hayek’s research should be considered in its integrity, in which 
case it “would radically redirect the enterprise of political economy.”  
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that agent’s innate cognitive structure based on the knowledge that he/she has 
derived from past experiences. Thus, knowledge is one of the main elements involved 
in the cognitive process of classification and plays an important role in it. It is this 
knowledge that allows different agents to classify the same stimuli differently, but it is 
also what enables different agents to recognize others’ behavior as corresponding to 
some implicitly shared norms (Hayek 1952). Moreover, the problems of knowledge in 
coordination and the complexity of decision-making are also the key issues to address 
when analyzing the rise of spontaneous social order, norms, and institutions (Hayek 
1937, 1960, 1973, 1976, 1979).  
As Hayek argued in a 1962 paper, agents analyze dispersed knowledge by means 
of a meta-conscious cognitive process. This process gives rise to implicit rules of 
behavior. These behavioral rules are, on one hand, the main tools with which agents 
interpret and classify other people’s behavior as corresponding to shared rules, and, 
on the other, they can be learned from others through a process of imitation. The 
imitation of implicit norms of behavior plays a fundamental role in the development 
of social order, allowing these norms to become stable in a certain social group (Hayek 
1967). The relevance of institutions as a tool of spreading dispersed knowledge is also 
a relevant topic in Veblen (1919). Veblen considers that habits both (i) enable agents 
to retain dispersed knowledge and (ii) promote the spread of such knowledge among 
individuals (see also Giddens 1984; Polanyi 1967). 
The second idea is that social and economic institutions must be explained as 
resulting from a “bottom-up” process. Hayek used the term “norm” to denote every 
type of rule of behavior that spontaneously emerges in the interaction between agents, 
pursuing their own interests, and the society in which they live. Such norms of 
behavior arise from an individual’s cognitive process of classifying external stimuli. 
These behavioral norms then became stable routines (rules) if they receive a positive 
feedback from outside (Hayek 1952). Moreover, norms of this kind can be shared by 
the social group in which they have emerged through a process of learning-by-
imitation (Hayek 1960). Once the rules have become shared values, they constitute 
the boundaries of individual choices and become the key elements in society’s 
coordination. Furthermore, they can be translated into legal rules, and may also be 
changed by the legislator whenever he/she considers them no longer coherent with 
the existing social order.19 The term “institutions,” as with “norms,” Hayek refers 
primarily to any spontaneously emerged and shared rule, shaping the framework in 
which agents can make their choices. Thus, formal institutions established by the state 
are obviously institutions in Hayekian terms, though not the only ones. 
19 In Hayek, the legislator should change law only when he/she faces a break in the existing social 
order. He also considered the evolution of law as a bottom-up process. In OIE, and in Commons in 
particular, law is much more than the epiphenomenal expression of customs (Commons 1924; Hodgson 
2009). While law depends on the spontaneous evolution of customs, it also requires the power and 
institutions of the state. Moreover, while imitation, in Hayek, is the essential vehicle to learn social rules, in 
OIE, there is the idea that, once a legal system emerges with a minimal degree of complexity, neither 
imitation, nor habit or instinct can fully explain the enforcement of intricate and extensive systems of law 
(Hodgson 2009, 149). 
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The relationship between cognition, shaping individual behavior, and the rise of 
norms, according to Hayek, shows that the process by which norms and institutions 
emerge starts from individual behavior. Both formal and informal institutions are 
created by a “bottom-up” process. This process is not simply one where the interaction 
of individuals gradually generates rules or institutions to help coordinate agents’ 
behavior, thereby producing social order. Rather, this process is a continuous one,20 
where agents contribute to shaping norms and institutions, while the latter influence 
individual behavior (Ambrosino 2006; Hodgson 2000, 2002). 
The third idea is that human interactions need institutions and norms. This 
applies to any kind of interaction — economic, social, or some other type. In some 
cases, simple cultural structures or implicit and informal rules are sufficient, but legal 
norms and institutions are often necessary as well (Hayek 1973, 1976, and 1979, for a 
discussion of the difference between Hayek and OIE and Commons, see Leathers 
1989 and Hodgson 2009). The need for institutional or behavioral rules is a 
consequence of the complexity of human interaction and of the fact that agents 
possess only idiosyncratic knowledge. Institutions and norms give agents a framework 
in which they can make their choices (Ambrosino 2006; Hayek 1973, 1976, 1979; 
Hodgson 2006). 
These three ideas suggest that there is a need for a joint analysis of the role and 
nature of legal norms, on one hand, and of the cognitive micro-foundations of human 
behavior, on the other. Nevertheless, what Hayek suggested is a kind of inquiry that 
does not imply the need for a reductionist approach to jointly model the complexity 
of human cognition and its relationship with social order. Hayek was concerned with 
the analysis of human action, where a person can be said to choose between various 
opportunities open to him/her. In most cases, the objects of human action are not 
“objective facts” of the kind used by natural sciences to build their models (Hayek 
1952). Hence, the analysis of social phenomena can be improved only “by the 
systematic and patient following up of the implications of many people holding 
certain views” (Hayek 1952, 34). This will yield understanding of “the unintended 
and often uncomprehended results of the separate and yet interrelated actions of men 
in society” (Hayek 1952, 34).21 
An approach, suggesting interaction of different research fields, has already been 
included in the cognitive approach to economic institutions which examine agents 
and institutions as part of the same framework (North 2005; Rizzello and Turvani 
2000, 2002). In this paper, in particular, I recommend an analysis of this kind to help 
develop the current approach to law and economics. Posner (2003) suggests that 
Hayek’s legal theory does not include any insights that may contribute to the 
development of current research. On the contrary, I claim that Hayek’s theory of 
mind — considered as the key to interpreting his legal theory — suggests that he still 
20 The reciprocal causation process, linking individual behavior and institutions, has been widely 
investigated in institutional economics (see, for example, Hodgson 2000, 2003a, 2003b). 
21 See Brown (2013). The author merely points out why OIE also stresses the relevance of new 
models and tools to investigate economic institutions in the tradition of Veblen and Commons. 
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has much to teach scholars of modern law and economics. Hayek’s work can be 
considered a pioneering attempt to develop a new approach to law and economics, 
with the preliminary step being a neurobiological inquiry into the cognitive processes 
generating human behavior (Ambrosino 2006; Caldwell 2002, 2004). In fact, only 
when a detailed understanding of such processes is obtained will it be possible to 
develop normative and predictive models. 
Interesting contributions to the development of this kind of cognitive approach 
to legal theory can be made by cognitive economics. Particularly important insights 
can be furnished by the sector of that research field now called 
“neuroeconomics” (Innocenti 2009). This is a new and flourishing approach that 
seeks to integrate economic theory on decision-making with psychological insights 
into people’s behavior and cognitive neuroscience, which studies the neural 
functioning of the human brain. Neuroeconomics, therefore, seeks to explain choice-
behavior in terms of the human brain by applying synergies of these different research 
fields (Glimcher et al. 2009). To date, this approach has developed a reductionist 
methodology by trying to model human behavior on the basis of new neurobiological 
insights into the functioning of the human brain and the roles played in decision-
making by different brain areas (Glimcher 2003). In this sense, neuroeconomics 
cannot be considered Hayekian in nature. Nevertheless, the relevance of some of its 
main research programs (for example, trust and reciprocity, reward and uncertainty, 
and the effects of addiction) to legal theory has been emphasized (Chorvat, McCabe 
and Smith 2004). This suggests that the neuroeconomics method, although 
reductionist, could be useful in developing a research approach to law and economics 
of a Hayekian type in the sense that its first research interest will be a better 
understanding of the cognitive mechanism defining agents’ choices.22 
In recent years, the disciplines of law and economics have shown a growing 
interest in cognitive neuroscience. Indeed, some interesting and important attempts 
to apply a neuroeconomic approach to economic analysis of law have been made 
(Freeman and Goodenough 2009). But applications of this approach refer mainly to 
judicial decisions and procedural law (Freigenson 2008; Mobbs et al. 2007). A proper 
cognitive approach to law and economics is still a “work in progress,” while the results 
of such an inquiry remain to be determined. 
In this paper, I suggested that developing a proper cognitive approach to law and 
economics, following a Hayekian “bottom-up” process in the rise of social norms, 
requires the development of a complete inquiry into better comprehending an 
individual’s mind. The purpose of such an inquiry will be to aid one’s understanding 
of the nature of law, its limits in binding behavior, and how behavior can be 
effectively changed. On a Hayekian note, only better cognitive knowledge of behavior 
and reactions to legal provisions can lead to improvements in the drafting and 
enforcement of law. Such methodological approach to law and institutions seems to 
be coherent with the OIE tradition. Both disciplines share the aim of investigating 
22 The relevance of neuroeconomics and neuroscience to the analysis of economic institutions has 
been pointed out by OIE (see Brown 2013; Herrmann-Pillath 2009). 
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human behavior to understand institutions and social norms. The approach I 
advocated here can also contribute to a research development in the field that is more 
in line with recent literature (Brown 2013; Herrmann-Pillath 2009).  
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